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FRÉDÉRIC  PUPPATTI
Far from being yet another panoramic account of China’s economicand diplomatic breakthroughs, this latest work by François Godementtakes readers (whether well-versed in contemporary China or not)
through the arcana of Communist Party politics a few months after one of
the worst political scandals in the history of the People’s Republic and at a
time when it is witnessing a top-level changing of guard that will guide it
through the decade to come.
Chapter 1 briefly reviews the case of Bo Xilai, the former Party Secretary
for Chongqing Municipality (pp. 17-34). Bo sought to turn the autonomous
city into a political, economic, and social laboratory for China by promoting
the Great Helmsman’s thoughts (especially by encouraging “Red Songs” in
the city’s public spaces). He wanted to use his successful crackdown on
crime as a launch-pad to the highest rungs of power. His downfall consti-
tuted the first real shakeup at the top since the 1989 Tiananmen events.
“incomparable continental and human masses” and whose “trilateral relations
are poised to play a role in structuring tomorrow’s world” (p. 9). Europe rejects
this rebalancing, which will determine the future of developed countries and
fundamentally reduce their relative political influence and economic might. 
In terms of changes in human resources (Part 1), Chindiafrica will account
for half the world’s population in 2030. And in 2050 it will also have half the
world’s human capital. In economic terms (Part 2), the grouping’s total GDP
(in purchasing power parity) will rise from a fourth to almost half of the
world’s in 2030 (China: 25%, India: 10%, and Africa: 11%) and 60% in 2050,
the authors say, although they are careful enough not to come up with precise
estimates. Of course, in 2030, the West will retain technological supremacy
in terms of innovation (Part 3), but “Chindia” and then Africa will be able to
adopt “low cost and frugal processes and business models” that are innovative
and better suited to their needs. The authors cite the success of Huawei or
the Indian “little cool” refrigerator in Africa as promising illustrations. 
All these changes could lead to industrialisation and agricultural moderni-
sation in Africa and as a result reduce pressure on natural and agricultural
resources (Part 4). Here, Boillot and Dembinski sound more cautious but on
the whole optimistic: oil-rich African countries could overcome the “curse
of black gold,” or the so-called “Dutch Disease,” China and India have the
capacity to become less voracious for hydrocarbons and other raw materi-
als, and Chindiafrica has the potential to become self-sufficient in food. The
authors also sound upbeat when it comes to the political consequences of
the shakeup (Part 5), while noting the weaknesses and contestations of the
“Chinese Model,” India’s soft state, the insurmountable fractures of the
African continent, and the US capacity for rebound, as well as the attrac-
tiveness of the European Union’s institutional norms.
What conclusion does this prospective analysis indicate? Many questions
and propositions, but no real conclusion. Actually, that is what the authors
have done. How will the main actors in this new grouping and other coun-
tries or groups of states, such as Europe, react and adapt to these changes?
No one knows. What Boillot and Dembinski seek to promote is a “moderated
globalisation” rightly inspired by the economist Dany Rodrik. (2) It is difficult
to disagree with this, seeing how China and India have sought to protect
themselves selectively against what they see as the destabilising currents
of “hyper-globalisation,” strongly suggesting that African countries
strengthen their states and do likewise, including vis-à-vis China and India.
That is precisely what Nigerian central bank governor Lamido Sanusi pro-
posed recently in a well-publicised op-ed highly critical of China. (3)
The main weakness of this work, it should be clear, lies not in observing
the unprecedented emergence of South-South economic, political, and
human linkages, especially among the three entities chosen, but rather in
the nature, coherence, and density of the trilateral relationship that forms
the basis of the authors’ approach. It is questionable whether China, India,
and Africa constitute a relevant grouping. The expanding relations and com-
plementarities among these economies are known, but what is their future
weight relative to US/EU relations, China/developed countries, and even
Brazil/Africa or the famous BRICS? What this book lacks is a comparative
and prospective analysis of the economic flows and diplomatic-strategic re-
lations among China, India, and Africa as well as among the current and fu-
ture main partners of these three entities. Thus, Sino-Indian economic and
political relations would most probably remain a complex mix of relatively
limited cooperation and lasting strategic competition. China’s weight in Africa
is heavy, India’s lighter, but tomorrow the two powers will have to continue
to face other major actors, such as the aforementioned Brazil, the United
States, EU, Japan… and South Africa. Moreover, the persistent tensions among
Chindiafrica – and within Africa – are not really addressed in the book’s
prospective construction. For instance, while the new Chinese diaspora in
Africa (one to five million people) represents a small share of the emigration
from the People’s Republic, it greatly influences local economies (or at least
some of them) and constitutes a source of real inter-community tension. 
All in all, it is clear that the weight of Chindiafrica or of the South in general
will keep growing, but neither constitutes a coherent grouping. Even less
than the BRICS, in fact. One is a statistical aggregate with no real projects or
common objectives, the other a convenient concept that includes not only
political regimes and cultures that are bound to remain very different but
also economies that, given the intrinsically unequal nature of development,
have increasingly less in common. Rebalancing, yes, but Chindiafrica will not
by itself make up tomorrow’s world. China, India, and Africa will contribute
to it no doubt by cooperating and also by squabbling occasionally. 
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Senior Researcher at CNRS, Professor at
Hong Kong Baptist University, Associate Researcher at Asia Centre,
Paris and CEFC, Hong Kong (cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk).
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A good deal of the country’s political life that the top leaders had tried to
keep from their compatriots’ gaze was revealed through this affair; Bo Xilai
indirectly exposed the actual and potential leaders to the wrath of a popu-
lation exasperated with the impunity enjoyed by the high and mighty, whose
interests were too closely linked to those of economic actors (Chapter 2).
The real or imagined wealth amassed by leaders while in office began to ex-
ercise the minds of millions of disadvantaged Chinese, and the elites faced the
immense challenge of reducing inequalities while safeguarding their privileges
and prerogatives (Chapter 3). The question has arisen whether the one-party
model can survive the social changes sweeping the country (Chapter 4). 
At Hu Jintao’s behest, the Party-state has reasserted control over the ju-
diciary: now the Supreme People’s Court oversees and confirms the death
penalty (Chapter 4). The Court has suspended several sentences, commuting
the death penalty to life in prison (while reserving the right to overturn its
verdict at any point in time). The role of the police and the army has been
strengthened in the repression apparatus, as evident in numerous preventive
campaigns and crackdowns on information circulating via the Internet. The
judiciary functions but the concept of justice has made no progress: the
legislative arsenal has grown over the past ten years, but as Godement
points out, China is still saddled with “rule by law rather than rule of law”
(Chapter 6). 
Debate is raging as never before between the conservatives, who favour
status quo with regard to reforms ushered in since the 1980s, and the re-
formers, who deem it necessary to introduce new reforms, both economic
and political. While it is conservatives of a reformist bent who prevailed in
the elevation of Xi Jinping (son of Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary hero who
was expelled and then victimised during the Cultural Revolution) to Party
chief, the new leadership has already recognised that the country has to
balance the fruits of growth in order to achieve a better redistribution. This
would also entail a fight against the plague of corruption: expulsion of farm-
ers from their land (by corrupt developers), the growing wealth chasm be-
tween rural and urban residents, and property becoming inaccessible to the
middle class. All this adds greatly to Chinese society’s current uneasiness.
China is thus at a crossroads, with the paternalistic and authoritarian
regime gradually losing steam, and with its socialist ideology proving insuf-
ficient to satisfy people’s aspirations for a good life (pp. 57-70). The author-
ities are obliged to flex their might, which has consequences for the
population as a whole: popular indignation is growing by the day, “mass in-
cidents” (qunti kangbao shijian 群体抗暴事件) – an official term meaning
protests – are increasing in number and becoming more violent (Chapter 7).
From a geopolitical and strategic perspective, signs of change were no-
ticeable from 2009 in Chinese diplomacy (Chapter 8). There is a persisting
feeling of unease fuelled by the premise of a likely American decline on the
one hand and Chinese leaders’ attitudes on the other: in the Chinese au-
thorities’ assessment, the 2008 financial crisis definitively weakened the
Western powers, including the United States. China is therefore taking ad-
vantage of this opportunity to promote its model of emergence (the Beijing
consensus). Paradoxically, however, the most demanding policies adopted
since then have only led to the return of the US to the regional landscape
(US pivot in Asia), tending to strengthen existing alliances between the
United States and its traditional allies (South Korea and Japan), or to create
new ones with former “ideological enemies” (as has become evident in re-
cent months with Vietnam) or even former “rogue states.” In this context,
the Burma example is instructive: Chinese muscle-flexing in military and
economic matters in Burma’s environs led the United States to extend a
hand to the former military regime as it embarked on unconditional trans-
formation (and which facilitated an unprecedented democratic opening). 
While it may be that real progress has been made since the start of eco-
nomic reforms, it is nevertheless the case that the basic principles of new
Chinese policies (territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and defence of
national interests) resolutely form part of a more coercive line in the last
few years, the contours of which remain imprecise to say the least (Chapter
11). In order not to upset the international balance of power, Beijing needs
to moderate its discourse and appear more transparent about its real in-
tentions. This will most certainly require adoption of a set of socio-eco-
nomic reforms (at the international level but primarily at the domestic
level), without which the “backlash” on the international front would have
grave consequences (Chapter 10). 
The book also broadens the debate and corroborates the viewpoint of an-
other historian and strategic expert, Edward N. Luttwak: (1) “great state
autism,” the persistence of history, and people’s general resentment over
uncertainties about the future are elements that could eventually further
threaten the fragile socio-economic equilibrium. How is it possible to com-
prehend on the one hand China’s hardening on the international front
(alongside its success over the past 30 years) highlighted by the proliferation
of tensions and territorial demands along its borders (South China Sea, the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands...), and on the other hand its trend toward economic
opening? In the final analysis, the issue linking the two works would be
whether China can overcome its contradictions and craft its own strategy
within a reasonable timeframe.
Godement’s book comes across as an excellent account of twenty-first
century China’s strengths and weaknesses – it is a country no one can ig-
nore – and a synthesis of the latest political and economic trends is clearly
set out in a way that addresses the general reader as well as academics and
other experts on contemporary China.
The author stresses that China no longer enjoys as much elbow room in
its bid for modernisation and international recognition as is assumed. While
there is hardly any doubt that China will emerge as the world’s leading econ-
omy by 2020, there is need to observe what new development imperatives
will be favoured by the new leadership (p. 69-70), as there is little doubt
that the international context will demand a modicum of transparency
(economic and diplomatic) on the part of Chinese leaders. Rapidly rising
social inequalities, the expanding scale of discontent (mostly among the
younger generation), and growing difficulties with various economic part-
ners on the international front compel China to overcome this challenging
new stage (perhaps decisively):
That is to say, there are no easy answers to the question of whether
China will adopt a global international vision based on universal
norms and cooperation, or adopt one based on multipolar competi-
tion in a world that would have moved beyond post-1945 Western
institutions (p. 231).
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Frédéric Puppatti is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at 
the University of Lille II (frederic.puppatti@etu.univ-lille2.fr).
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